Who Calls the Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections by Choi, Stephen J et al.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2013 
Who Calls the Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote on Director 
Elections 
Stephen J. Choi 
New York University School of Law 
Jill E. Fisch 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Marcel Kahan 
New York University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law 
Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Other 
Business Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Choi, Stephen J.; Fisch, Jill E.; and Kahan, Marcel, "Who Calls the Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote on 
Director Elections" (2013). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 374. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/374 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\3-1\HLB103.txt unknown Seq: 1 20-JUN-13 13:40
WHO CALLS THE SHOTS? HOW MUTUAL
FUNDS VOTE ON DIRECTOR ELECTIONS
STEPHEN CHOI,* JILL FISCH,** AND MARCEL KAHAN***
ABSTRACT
Shareholder voting has become an increasingly important focus of corpo-
rate governance, and mutual funds control a substantial percentage of share-
holder voting power. The manner in which mutual funds exercise that power,
however, is poorly understood. Because of the economic structure of mutual
funds, there are particular reasons to be concerned about the extent to which
mutual funds may seek to economize on the cost of their voting decisions by
employing short cuts or delegating voting decisions to proxy advisors. These
concerns, if true, hamper the potential effectiveness of regulatory reforms such
as proxy access and say on pay.
This Article analyzes mutual fund voting decisions in uncontested director
elections—an area in which the likelihood that funds will employ voting short
cuts is high because the information costs of informed voting are high, and the
stakes are low. We find evidence that mutual funds use various cost-saving mea-
sures but that the incidence of implicitly delegating voting authority ISS is less
than commonly believed, especially for larger funds. Only a small proportion of
mutual funds as measured by asset size appear to vote in “blind reliance” on ISS
recommendations. Although ISS recommendations are extremely important,
their importance seems to take the form of identifying problematic directors,
forming a focal point around which funds may consider withholding their votes.
Most funds do not appear, however, to follow these recommendations automati-
cally. To the contrary, as measured by asset size, more funds seem to blindly
follow management recommendations than blindly follow ISS.
We examine, in more detail, the voting behavior of the three largest mutual
fund families:Vanguard, Fidelity, and American Funds. Together these three
families account for more than one third of total mutual fund assets. We find that
with respect to uncontested director elections the funds in these families vote
largely in lockstep. Voting decisions of the three fund families differ substantially
both from each other and from ISS recommendations. This is strong evidence of
heterogeneity in the voting behavior of mutual funds in director elections.
Finally, we examine the factors associated with high “withhold” votes in
director elections. Although an ISS “withhold” recommendation is a key factor
in triggering a high “withhold” vote, the effectiveness of the recommendation is
limited unless it is combined with an additional factor. We identify four signifi-
cant additional factors: a “withhold” vote by Fidelity, the director missing 25%
of board meetings, the company having ignored a shareholder resolution that
received majority support, and a Vanguard “withhold” vote on outside directors
with business ties to the company. Our findings suggest steps that companies
and directors should take to reduce the likelihood of receiving a high “withhold”
vote.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, the field of corporate governance has focused on increasing
shareholder voting power. Regulatory developments and company-specific
governance changes allow shareholders to vote on more issues and accord
greater weight to their votes.1 Increasingly, shareholders are approving
shareholder proposals to adopt or request structural changes, such as the
elimination of poison pills and staggered boards.2 Shareholders at most large
public companies now elect directors through majority rather than plurality
voting.3 Delaware4 amended its state corporation law in 2009 to authorize
1 The New York Stock Exchange recently amended its rules to eliminate discretionary
broker voting in uncontested elections. The rule change had the effect of increasing the power
of shareholders who cast a vote. See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of
Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 873–74 (2010) (describing the rule
change and its significance). As we noted in that article, had the rule been in effect in 2009,
two of Citigroup’s director nominees would not have been elected. See id. at 874.
2 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Staggered Boards
and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 3 (Harv. Law Sch. John
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 697, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1706806 (describing increasing institutional investor opposition to stag-
gered boards and efforts to dismantle existing staggered boards); Soren Lindstrom, Share-
holder Activism Against Poison Pills: An Effective Antidote?, 9 WALL ST. LAWYER 17, 17
(2005) (“Today shareholders increasingly are exercising their right to vote for proposals to
eliminate shareholder rights plans . . . .”).
3 See, e.g., Sarah Johnson, In the Minority on Majority Voting, CFO.COM (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14552148/?f=rsspage (reporting that investors supported ma-
jority voting in over half the companies that held a vote on the issue in 2010, and that nearly
70% of S&P 500 companies currently have majority voting).
4 The majority of publicly traded corporations are incorporated in Delaware. See Division
of Corporations, STATE OF DELAWARE, http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012)
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both proxy access bylaws and bylaws permitting reimbursement of share-
holders’ proxy solicitation expenses.5 The Dodd-Frank Act6 gave sharehold-
ers the right to cast an advisory vote on executive compensation (“Say on
Pay”)7 and authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to
adopt rules granting shareholders the right to have their board of director
nominees for the board of directors appear in the issuer’s proxy statement
(“Proxy Access”).8
The potential effectiveness of increasing shareholder voting power de-
pends critically on the manner in which shareholders exercise that power.
One shareholder group of particular concern is mutual funds. Mutual funds
constitute the largest group of institutional investors, holding approximately
29% of the equity of U.S. public companies,9 and their ownership percentage
is growing.10 Traditionally mutual funds were passive investors, rarely chal-
lenging management and often not even exercising the voting rights of the
shares in the portfolio companies in which they invested.11 In 2002, how-
ever, the Department of Labor issued a release stating that voting was a
component of pension plans’ fiduciary obligations to their beneficiaries.12
The following year, the SEC adopted a rule that required mutual funds to
disclose their voting policies and proxy voting records.13 The adoption of
this rule focused attention on mutual fund voting behavior.
Mutual funds have the potential to affect the outcome of most share-
holder votes due to the size of their collective equity interests.14 Addition-
ally, unlike most retail investors, mutual funds have the scale and
sophistication to acquire information about their portfolio companies. How-
ever, mutual funds are merely intermediaries—holders of pooled invest-
ments—and the funds’ investors, those with an economic interest in the
(stating that a majority of publicly traded corporations and 63% of Fortune 500 companies are
incorporated in Delaware).
5 See DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, 8 Del. C. § 112 (2009) (authorizing proxy access bylaws);
see id. 8 DEL. C. § 113 (2009) (authorizing bylaws that provide for reimbursement of share-
holder proxy solicitation expenses).
6 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203,124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
7 See id. § 951.
8 See id., § 971. The SEC adopted a proxy access rule, SEC Rule 14a-11, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-11(2010), but the D.C. Circuit invalidated the rule based on the SEC’s failure ade-
quately to assess its costs and benefits. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
9 See INV. CO. INST., 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, 7 (2012), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2012_factbook.pdf.
10 See id.
11 See Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1430–31 (2002).
12 See Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2002) (fiduciary act of managing employee benefit plan assets
consisting of equity securities includes voting of proxies appurtenant to those securities).
13 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(c)(2) (2003).
14 See, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 11 at 1421 (explaining that mutual funds have become R
“the swing vote in U.S. corporate governance”).
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underlying securities, lack voting authority.15 Mutual fund voting decisions
are made by agents, either by the mutual fund board or the fund officers
employed by the fund’s investment advisor.16 Of particular significance is
that the business model of a mutual fund company consists not of maximiz-
ing absolute fund performance but rather of maximizing the performance of
its funds relative to a benchmark or a peer group of comparable funds.17
Toward that end, a fund’s voting behavior is subject to a peculiar dynamic.
The costs expended by the fund in setting voting policy and making specific
voting decisions reduce the fund’s relative performance. Voting decisions are
particularly costly because a mutual fund family may invest in hundreds or
even thousands of portfolio companies.18 The benefits produced by informed
voting, however, accrue to the portfolio company and all funds that invest in
that company, including those from competing fund families. This free rider
effect creates a strong incentive for funds to economize on their voting
decisions.19
Funds can economize on their voting decisions in several ways. One
option is for fund families to centralize voting within a central decision
maker rather than allowing each individual fund to make its own voting
decisions. We would expect members of a fund family that centralizes its
voting decisions to vote in lockstep. A second possibility is for funds simply
to vote in favor of management. Voting with management is not just simple,
but it may also be rational20 in the sense that, by deciding to invest in a
15 See Jennifer S. Taub, Able but not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to
Advocate for Shareholder Rights, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 843 (2009) (describing this
intermediation).
16 Both the fund’s board and its investment advisor owe fiduciary duties to the fund in
exercising their power to make voting decisions. See, e.g., Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies
and Proxy Voting Records By Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg.
6564, 6565 (Feb. 7, 2003) (explaining that investment advisor’s fiduciary duty to the fund
“extends to all functions undertaken on the fund’s behalf, including the voting of proxies relat-
ing to the fund’s portfolio securities.”); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426–30
(2010) (explaining role and duties of mutual fund directors).
17 Researchers have identified additional goals for mutual fund sponsors such as increas-
ing the range of funds offered and product differentiation. See, e.g., Massimo Massa, How do
family strategies affect fund performance? When performance-maximization is not the only
game in town, 67 J. FIN. ECON. 249 (2003).
18 A report in 2004 stated that the average equity fund held 140 different stocks. Janice
Revell, The power of concentration, Mutual funds that buy fewer stocks and hold them longer
beat the competition, CNN MONEY (Aug. 23, 2004), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune_archive/2004/08/23/379390/index.htm. Fidelity currently reports offering 68 separate
funds in the domestic equity category alone. Fund Results by Category: Domestic Equity
Funds, FIDELITY, http://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/category-performance-annual-
total-returns/STK (last visited May 24, 2012).
19 For an early article explaining how the free rider effect reduces the incentive for institu-
tional investors to engage in efficient levels of monitoring see Jill E. Fisch, Relationship In-
vesting: Will it Happen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1012 (1994).
20 A more sinister explanation for why funds vote with management is their desire to
obtain pension-related business. See, e.g., Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 16,
at 20–21 (explaining that fund’s investment advisor may face a conflict of interest in voting the
securities of a portfolio company when the advisor “also manages or seeks to manage the
[company’s] retirement plan assets.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\3-1\HLB103.txt unknown Seq: 5 20-JUN-13 13:40
2013] Who Calls the Shots? 39
portfolio company, the fund has decided that it trusts the company’s manage-
ment.21 A third way to reduce costs is to outsource the fund’s voting deci-
sions to an external advisor. In particular, critics have expressed concern
over the extent to which mutual funds directly or indirectly delegate their
voting judgments to Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), the leading
proxy advisor.22 As related by Delaware’s Chancellor Leo Strine, the primary
concern is that some institutional investors will simply follow ISS’s advice
rather than do any thinking of their own.23
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we situate our study within
the empirical literature on mutual fund voting. In Part II, we describe our
methodology and examine the extent to which mutual funds centralize their
voting and employ shortcuts to minimize their costs of voting. In particular,
we focus on the degree to which funds follow the recommendations of either
management or ISS. We find evidence that, although funds appear to econo-
mize by centralizing their voting decisions, their use of voting shortcuts is
less common than frequently assumed. In particular, we find a substantial
degree of divergence from ISS recommendations, refuting the claim that
most funds follow ISS blindly.
Part III expands on our analysis by examining in more detail the voting
behavior of the three largest mutual fund families: Vanguard, Fidelity, and
the American Funds. The rationale for focusing on these funds is clear—
together, they account for more than one-third of total mutual fund assets,24
making their voting behavior most important both in understanding mutual
fund voting and more broadly in assessing the potential impact of institu-
tional investors. They also reflect distinctive business models and investment
approaches. We find that, with respect to uncontested director elections, the
funds in these families vote largely in lockstep, but that their specific voting
decisions vary substantially vis-à-vis one another and the ISS
recommendations.
Finally, in Part IV, we examine the factors associated with high “with-
hold” votes in director elections in which directors receive 30% or more
“withhold” votes as a percentage of votes cast. We find that, although an
ISS “withhold” recommendation is a key factor in triggering a high “with-
hold” vote, the effectiveness of the recommendation is limited unless it is
combined with an additional factor. By analyzing specific company and di-
21 Traditionally funds that were unhappy with management expressed their disfavor by
following the so-called “Wall Street Rule” and selling their stock. See Palmiter, supra note 11,
at 1430–34 (discussing various explanations for mutual fund passivity); see also John C. Cof-
fee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM
L. REV. 1277, 1288 n. 29 (1991) (describing possible origin of the “Wall Street Rule”).
22 See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of
Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 658 (2009) (describing concerns over the influence of
ISS on institutional investor voting decisions).
23 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005).
24 See infra note 98 (providing statistics on mutual fund asset holdings).
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rector attributes we identify four significant additional factors: (1) a “with-
hold” vote by Fidelity, (2) a director who has missed 25% of board
meetings, (3) a company that ignored a shareholder resolution that received
majority support, and (4) Vanguard’s “withhold” vote on outside directors
with business ties to the company. When an ISS “withhold” recommenda-
tion is issued in conjunction with at least one of these four factors, it is
associated with a 49% probability of the director receiving a high “with-
hold” votes. Directors in this group account for 48% of all directors who
received high “withhold” votes.
I. BACKGROUND
As noted above, mutual funds possess several distinctive attributes.25
First, a mutual fund itself is simply a pool of assets created by a financial
institution known as a fund sponsor. The legal structure of the mutual fund
consists of a corporation or a trust, but funds outsource their operations in-
cluding administrative services and investment decisions through contracts
with third parties.26 The most important of these third parties is the invest-
ment advisor, which is reasonable for making investment decisions and com-
pensated according to the terms of an advisory contract.
Fund sponsors may be independent entities or banks, brokerage compa-
nies, or insurance companies. Most fund sponsors offer multiple funds com-
prising a fund family27 and create, merge, and close individual funds on an
ongoing basis in response to investor demand.28 The organization of mutual
funds into families is important in that large fund families can often generate
economies of scale and increased flexibility.29 Researchers have documented
that some fund families manage their funds as a “portfolio” rather than mak-
ing operational decisions purely on an individual fund basis.30 Finally, some
research documents performance advantages in funds that are part of a large
fund family.31
25 For a general description of the legal structure of mutual funds see generally Jill E.
Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961,
1967–75 (2010).
26 See id. at 1967, 1968.
27 Daniel Li, Mutual Fund Family Strategies and Bayesian Alphas 1 (SSRN Working Pa-
per, Jan. 8, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1981438 (estimating that 80% of mu-
tual funds worldwide belong to a fund family).
28 See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 9, at 15–16 (“fund sponsors create new funds to meet
investor demand, and they merge or liquidate funds that do not attract sufficient investor
interest.”).
29 Li, supra note 27, at 2.
30 See, e.g., Jose Miguel Gaspar, Massimio Massa & Pedro Matos, Favoritism in Mutual
Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 73 (2006) (demon-
strating that sponsors engage in cross-fund subsidization in order to create “high-value
funds.”).
31 See, e.g., Ilan Guedj & Jannette Papastakaikoudi, Can Mutual Fund Families Affect the
Performance of Their Funds? 2 (SSRN Working Paper, Oct. 2003), available at http://ssrn.
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Fund vote decision making takes place at three different levels. First,
the Investment Company Act requires funds to have a board of directors.32 It
is common for the same directors to serve on the boards of multiple funds
within the fund family, a structure known as the unitary board.33 A unitary
board obviously has the effect of centralizing fund decision making that oc-
curs at the board level.34 In most fund families, the board of directors has
some role in overseeing or approving the funds’ proxy voting policies.
Second, mutual funds outsource their investment decisions to an invest-
ment advisor. Again, the advisor, although technically a separate entity, typi-
cally provides investment management services for all or a subset of the
funds within a fund family. As an example, Fidelity Management & Re-
search Company is the investment advisor to Fidelity Investment’s family of
mutual funds. The agreement between each fund and the advisor dictates the
terms of the advisory relationship, including the advisor’s fees, and must be
approved by the fund board.35 The advisory agreement may delegate voting
decisions to the investment advisor. In turn, the investment advisor may
make voting decisions at the advisory company level, often through the use
of a proxy voting committee.36 Third, voting decisions may be made by indi-
vidual portfolio managers, who are employees of the investment advisor.37
The various levels of mutual fund decision making complicate the task
of analyzing mutual fund voting behavior. Although voting rights belong to
the funds themselves, each fund’s sponsor and advisor may have different
objectives from those of the investors, and those objectives may dominate,
especially when voting decisions are made for a family of funds in a central-
ized manner. One such concern is conflicts of interest that may be motivated
by the business ties of the fund sponsor or advisor. Proxy voting decisions
also raise policy and strategic issues for the fund family, including reputa-
com/abstract=467282 (reporting greater performance persistence for funds that are part of a
large fund family).
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006) (requiring mutual funds to have their own boards of
directors or trustees whether or not they are structured as corporations).
33 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing survey data
showing that 81% of responding funds have a unitary board).
34 See Letter from Heidi Stam, Managing Director and Gen. Counsel, Vanguard Group
Inc., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Aug. 18, 2009), www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-10-09/s71009-326.pdf (explaining that “unitary boards are powerful and effi-
cient bodies, better able to moderate the influence of the advisers who operate the funds day-
to-day.”).
35 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006).
36 See NATIONWIDE FUND ADVISORS, SUMMARY OF PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 1, availa-
ble at http://www.nationwide.com/pdf-mutual-funds/proxy-nationwide.pdf (explaining that the
Nationwide Funds delegate voting authority to the funds’ investment advisor, Nationwide Fund
Advisors which, in turn, oversees proxy voting through a “Proxy Voting Committee”).
37 See, e.g., Proxy Voting Policies, T. ROWE PRICE GROUP, INC., http://corporate.trowe
price.com/ccw/home/ourCompany/proxyVotingPolicies.do (last visited May 24, 2012) (ex-
plaining that, although the proxy committee develops voting guidelines, “Ultimately, the port-
folio managers decide how to vote on the proxy proposals of companies in their portfolios.”).
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tion and public perception.38 As a result, the extent to which proxy voting
authority is allocated among different fund decision makers and, in turn,
allocated differently within different fund families, poses challenges in mea-
suring and understanding the way funds vote their shares.39
Several empirical articles examine mutual fund voting. One notable dis-
tinction in the literature concerns the difference between director elections
and issue proposals; several articles study both, but shareholder proposals
and director elections present somewhat different issues. For example, a
number of scholars have documented the growing shareholder opposition to
takeover defenses.40 This trend is reflected in statistics that measure the over-
all degree of shareholder voting support for management.41
In an early study of mutual fund voting in the two years following the
SEC rule change, Rothberg and Lilien found that the mutual funds in their
sample voted against management-nominated director candidates 14% of the
time; votes against management concerning antitakeover issues, executive
compensation, and issuances of preferred stock were much higher.42 Another
early study by Cremers and Romano used matched pairs to study the specific
effect of the rule change.43 Although they reported finding no evidence “that
the rule altered mutual funds’ behavior,” they did find some evidence that
fund support for management-sponsored proposals on executive equity in-
centive compensation plans increased following the rule change.44 This find-
ing suggests the possibility that required disclosure decreased fund
willingness to openly oppose a management proposal. Cremers and Romano
also noted that shareholder voting support for management had declined
substantially from that reported in earlier studies.45 Ng et al. studied mutual
fund voting on a range of shareholder and management proposals, including
38 See, e.g., Laura Smitherman, T. Rowe Price Takes Activist Role: Recent Takeover Deals
Stir Mutual Fund Giant, BALT. SUN, June 8, 2007, at 1E. (describing media attention focused
on T. Rowe Price after its money managers took activist positions with respect to several
corporate buyouts).
39 In particular, it is unclear whether it is appropriate to treat separately funds that vote as
part of a centralized family voting decision. Cf. Lilian Ng, Qinghai Wang & Nataliya Zaiats,
Firm Performance and Mutual Fund Voting, 33 J. BANK. & FIN. 2207, 2210 (2009) (measuring
“mutual fund voting based on the percentage of funds with affirmative votes relative to the
total number of funds that cast votes.”). The extent to which fund votes should be considered
independent of fund size is another issue that we address below.
40 See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Investor’s Choices: Institutional Shareholders, Private Eq-
uity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 757 (2003) (docu-
menting “substantial and growing shareholder opposition to takeover defenses.”)
41 See, e.g., Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evi-
dence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157, 167 (2006) (measuring the extent
to which funds supported management).
42 Id. at 168.
43 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting
on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rule, 13 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 220 (2011).
44 Id. at 265.
45 Id. at 222.
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director elections.46 They found that mutual fund voting was related to the
prior performance of the portfolio company—“Mutual funds render fewer
affirmative votes for management proposals and more affirmative votes for
shareholder proposals if prior firm performance has been weak.”47
Matvos and Ostrovsky focused specifically on director elections.48 In a
study of voting during the 2003–2005 time period, they found that the aver-
age director received a 90% “for” vote from mutual funds.49 The authors
also demonstrated consistency in voting patterns within fund families,50 but
found considerable heterogeneity among funds, observing that some funds
were consistently more likely to support management than others.51 Matvos
and Ostrovsky also documented substantial peer effects, showing that a fund
was significantly more likely to “withhold” its votes from a director candi-
date if its peers were expected to do so.52
Several articles look specifically at potential mutual fund conflicts of
interest, hypothesizing that funds or fund families may be influenced by bus-
iness concerns in their voting decisions. These studies, as noted above, con-
centrate on issue proposals rather than director elections. A significant
number of studies have found that funds with business ties to their portfolio
companies vote differently from funds that lack such ties.53 Davis & Kim,
for example, found that funds that derived a substantial portion of their man-
agement fees from companies in their portfolios were more likely to favor
management in their voting behavior.54 Taub, studying the ten largest mutual
funds, found that a higher value of defined contribution plan assets under
management for the funds’ advisor was correlated with reduced support for
shareholder proposals.55 Similarly, Ashraf et al. found that mutual funds with
pension-related business were less likely to support shareholder proposals on
46 See Ng et al., supra note 39.
47 Id. at 2216.
48 See Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Heterogeneity and Peer Effects in Mutual
Fund Proxy Voting, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 90 (2010).
49 Id. at 95.
50 But see Angela Morgan, Annette Poulsen, Jack Wolf, & Tina Yang, Mutual Funds as
Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Voting, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 914, 927 (2011) (finding “sub-
stantial divergence across funds within the same family with respect to voting on shareholder
proposals.”)
51 See Matvos & Ostrovsky, supra note 48, at 96–97.
52 See id. at 97. (finding that there are “significant peer effects in fund voting behavior.”);
Cf. at 97 (showing that “mutual funds are more likely to vote ‘for’ a director if they think other
funds are more likely vote ‘for’ her as well”).
53 But see Rothberg & Lilien, supra note 41, at 171 (finding found no significant differ-
ence in voting between four mutual fund companies and four other funds that are affiliated
with financial services firms).
54 Cf. Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds,
85 J. FIN. ECON. 552, 569 (2007) (finding that funds are less inclined to vote in favor of
shareholder proposals opposed by management when the fund has substantial business ties
with the company in question).
55 See Taub, supra note 15, at 845–46.
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executive compensation.56 Ng et al. studied mutual funds with business ties
and found differences in fund voting on some governance and compensation
issues.57
Finally, a few studies examine the influence of ISS on voting decisions.
Cai et al. found that a negative ISS recommendation increased “withhold”
votes in director elections by approximately 20%.58 By contrast, in an earlier
article, we estimated that ISS swings only 6–10% of the vote in uncontested
director elections.59 Neither of these studies looked specifically at mutual
fund voting, however, and ISS may enjoy greater influence with other share-
holder groups, such as public pension funds.60 Cotter et al. examined voting
on shareholder proposals, and found that mutual funds voted more consist-
ently with ISS recommendations than with management recommendations.61
Ng et al. similarly found that mutual fund voting correlates with ISS
recommendations.62
The Investment Company Institute has also published various statistical
analyses of mutual fund voting.63 One recent report reveals that, although
mutual funds consistently supported management and management propos-
als, by voting in favor of director nominees more than 90% of the time
during 2007–2009, this support has declined over the same period, largely
due to fund concerns about executive compensation, which have led to in-
creased “withhold” votes for directors on board compensation committees.64
56 See Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman, & Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Conflicts of Interest
and Mutual Fund Proxy Voting: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compen-
sation 5 (October 9, 2009), available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228811339_
Conflicts_of_interest_and_mutual_fund_proxy_voting_Evidence_from_shareholder_proposals
_on_executive_compensation; see also Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman & Harley E.
Ryan, Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 47 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
567, 587 (2012) (finding that this effect exists at both client and non-client portfolio
companies).
57 Ng et al. defined a mutual fund with business ties as “one that has banking, insurance,
brokerage, or investment banking parent, or a large 401(k) business”). Ng et al., supra note 39,
at 2216.
58 See Jie Cai, Jacqueline Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN.
2389, 2391 (2009).
59 See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 906. R
60 See generally, Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence
on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV.
315, 342 (2008) (describing delegation by public pension funds of voting authority and the
preparation of voting guidelines).
61 See James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual
Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2010).
62 See Ng et al., supra note 39, at 2213–14.
63 The Investment Company Institute, a membership organization, is the national associa-
tion of U.S. investment companies, which includes mutual funds as well as ETFs, closed-end
funds and unit investment trusts. See About ICI, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, http://
www.ici.org/about_ici (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
64 See Sean S. Collins, Trends In Proxy Voting By Registered Investment Companies,
2007–2009, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE, Nov. 2010, at 12 fig.
8.
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II. ECONOMIZING ON VOTING
A. Methodology and Sample Construction
Our study focuses specifically on uncontested director elections. Direc-
tor elections differ significantly from votes on shareholder proposals because
they are much more information intensive. Many funds have developed
guidelines on how to vote on certain issue proposals, such as proposals to
declassify the boards of directors or to split the chairman and CEO posi-
tions.65 These guidelines will determine most of the funds’ votes on these
types of proposals. In contrast, director votes are issuer- and director-spe-
cific. As such, director elections present a greater need for funds to econo-
mize on research costs. To the extent a fund relies on ISS for its research, it
is potentially more dependent on the information supplied by ISS with re-
spect to director elections. We expect that these information challenges are
likely to affect funds differentially—larger fund families with centralized
voting can spread the costs of their research across a number of funds.
We consider only uncontested director elections because contested elec-
tions are typically associated with a related strategic or economic event, such
as the proposed sale of a company, a merger, or a restructuring.66 We hy-
pothesize that shareholder voting in such elections reflects, to a substantial
degree, the merits of the proposed transaction rather than the characteristics
of the particular director nominees. In addition, the voting behavior of mu-
tual funds in uncontested elections offers, more than any other area, insight
into the extent to which mutual funds are engaging in ongoing governance
oversight.
To construct the data sample for this study, we obtained a list of 348
mutual fund families from the Investment Company Institute. The list identi-
fied the quantity of assets under management for each fund family, broken
down between short-term and long-term assets as of March 31, 2007.67 We
sorted this list by the amount of long-term assets.68
We then selected a total sample of 60 fund families, 20 drawn from
each of three size categories: large, medium, and small. For the category of
large funds, we chose the 20 fund families with the largest amount of long-
65 See, e.g., Vanguard Web Site, Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, THE VANGUARD
GROUP, INC., https://personal.vanguard.com/us/content/Home/WhyVanguard/AboutVanguard
ProxyVotingGuidelinesContent.jsp (last visited Oct. May 24, 2012) (Vanguard proxy voting
guidelines which state, among others, that Vanguard funds “will generally support proposals to
declassify existing boards (whether proposed by management or shareholders) and will block
efforts by companies to adopt classified board structures, in which only part of the board is
elected each year.”)
66 See, e.g., Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 71, 102–03 (Del.
Ch. 2011) (describing election contest conducted by Air Products as part of takeover battle).
67 See e-mail from Erin Short to Marcel Kahan (on file with authors).
68 We hypothesized that the quantity of long term assets served as a rough proxy for the
fund family’s equity holdings. We thereby sought to reduce the effect of a family’s short term
fixed income funds, such as money market funds, on our classification.
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term assets.69 The families in this group held long-term assets ranging in
amount from $88 billion to $1.115 trillion, with an average of $275 billion
and a median of $136 billion. For medium-size families, we chose the 20
families with the largest amount of long-term assets below $40 billion.
Funds in this group held long-term assets ranging from $18 billion to $39
billion with an average of $27 billion and a median of $26 billion. For small
families, we chose the 20 families holding the largest amount of long-term
assets below $10 billion. The families in this group held long-term assets
ranging from $5 billion to $10 billion with an average and median of $7
billion.70
For each fund family, we examined Form N-PX filings with the SEC
and tabulated the votes by domestic equity funds of the sample families in
uncontested director elections in 2005 and 2006.71 We examined only elec-
tions at S&P 1500 companies, and we eliminated any fund that cast less than
100 votes in these elections, leaving us with 719 funds across the different
fund families. Of the sixty families initially selected, we had to eliminate
four because they had no funds that satisfied these criteria.
For each director vote, we collected data72 from SEC filings and the
IRRC Governance database on firm- and director-specific characteristics
that might influence the likelihood of a “withhold” vote.73 Using the meth-
odology developed in our prior work,74 we determined: (1) whether the di-
rector was the CEO (CEO), an employee of the company other than the CEO
(Empl_Dir), an outside directors with certain links to the company (OutDir-
Link), or a new Director (New Director); (2) whether the director was a
member of the audit (AuditMbr), the compensation committee (CompMbr),
69 Because the fund industry is heavily concentrated in the largest fund families, this
methodology has the effect of causing our sample to include approximately 50% of the domes-
tic equities held by mutual funds.
70 Families for which no data were available on CRSP, who had no domestic funds, or
who were affiliated with a larger fund family were eliminated and the family with the next
lower long-term assets was chosen instead.
71 This article is the third in a sequence of papers that examine proxy advisory firm recom-
mendations and mutual fund voting. See Choi et al., supra note 1; Choi et al., supra note 22. R
The dataset used in all three of the articles derives from fund voting and proxy advisory firm
recommendations from 2005 to 2006, the first years mutual fund voting data was publicly
available, and does not encompass more current data as of the date of this third article. None-
theless, we believe that the relationship between proxy advisory firm recommendations and
mutual fund voting behavior remains largely the same in 2012 as compared with the 2005 to
2006 period. For example, in 2005, 445 directors at 228 S&P 1500 companies had withhold
votes of 15% or greater. See GEORGESON, 2008 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 7
(2008). The financial crisis did correspond with an increase in directors receiving high levels
of withhold votes. In 2009, 1,027 directors at 378 S&P 1500 companies had withhold votes of
15% or greater. See GEORGESON, 2011 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 5 (2011).
But the effect of the financial crisis appears to be temporary. By 2011, 549 directors at 254
S&P 1500 companies had withhold votes of 15% or greater—similar to the 2005 level. Id.
72 For a definition of these and other variables, see the Appendix.
73 See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 662–63 (explaining the rationale for this methodology R
and the basis for selecting these particular characteristics).
74 See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 888–89; Choi et al., supra note 22, at 661–63. R
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or the nominating committee (NomMbr); and (3) whether the director was a
member of at least three other “major” company boards during the year
prior to the annual meeting date (ManyBds),75 whether the director attended
less than 75% of the director meetings (Attendance), whether the director
was an Interlocking director (Interlock), and whether the director was 75
years or older (Age75). In addition, for each company in the sample and
each year, we collected data from SEC filings, press releases, the IRRC
Governance database, the Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance Re-
views, and CRSP on (1) whether the first public report of a restatement to a
company’s financial statement occurred within two years prior to the annual
meeting (Prior Restat), whether the first public statement of an SEC investi-
gation or enforcement action occurred within two years prior to the annual
meeting (Prior SEC), and whether the company rejected an issue proposal
that had received majority shareholder support in the last year (IP No); (2)
whether the company had a classified board (ClassBd), a poison pill (Poison
Pill), cumulative voting (CumVote), or golden parachutes (Golden Para-
chute); (3) whether the company was in the top or bottom 5% of the compa-
nies ranked based on the abnormal holding period return for the three-year
period prior to the meeting date for the year of the recommendation
(Top5AbRet, Bot5Abret);76 and (4) whether the CEO for the company was in
the top 5% total excess compensation (Top5AbComp).77 We obtained data
on ISS’s voting recommendation for each director who was subject to elec-
tion during our sample period directly from ISS or from LEXIS (VoteISS =
1 for a “withhold” recommendation and 0 for a “for” recommendation).
B. Centralization
As noted above, both the research and the mechanics of proxy voting
are costly. To reduce these costs, a fund family may centralize the voting
decisions across some or all of the funds in the family. Centralization also
enables a family to monitor strategic or business concerns associated with its
voting behavior. Prior studies have disagreed about the extent to which
funds within a family vote differently, and the degree of centralization is
critical in determining whether voting decisions should be analyzed at the
family level or at the level of the individual fund. We therefore begin by
examining the extent to which fund votes within a single fund family deviate
from each other.
75 We use the IRRC data on other “major” company boards held by directors for the year
prior to the annual meeting.
76 We define the abnormal holding period return for the three year period prior to the
meeting date for the year of the recommendation as the holding period return for the specific
company minus the holding period return of the CRSP value-weighted market index for the
same period.
77 See Choi et al., supra note 22, at 662; Choi et al., supra note 1, at 889. R
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Within each fund family, we are able to identify separate clusters of
funds that vote largely in lockstep with one another. We treat funds in the
same fund family as voting in lockstep with one another if there are no or
only a trivial number of deviations in the votes on the same nominees for the
same company. Using these clusters, we are able to characterize the extent to
which each fund family’s voting is centralized. We classify a fund family as
fully centralized if all funds in that family belong to a single voting cluster.
We classify a family as substantially centralized if a substantial block of the
family’s funds vote in lockstep, forming a single cluster. A substantial block
is defined as funds accounting for at least 70% (but less than 100%) of the
aggregate fund family assets.78 We characterize a fund family as non-sub-
stantially centralized if it lacks a single such dominant cluster. In total, the
719 funds of the 56 families formed 127 different clusters.
In total, of the 56 families in our sample, we were able to classify 38
families.79 Of these families, we find that 21 were fully centralized and an-
other 12 were substantially centralized; only 5 were classified as non-sub-
stantially centralized. We had hypothesized that centralization was one way
in which funds could economize on voting costs. Our findings are consistent
with this hypothesis.
While we find that fund voting is often highly centralized, the degree of
centralization varies by fund family.80 Centralization is substantially more
common among smaller fund families. As Table 1 shows, 83% of the small
funds are fully centralized, while only 40% of the medium-sized and 44% of
the large funds are fully centralized. In chi-square tests, the difference in
centralization between large and small finds is statistically significant (Pear-
son chi2(2) = 5.0613, Pr = 0.080).81
We note that even in fund families that were classified as non-substan-
tially centralized, some of the funds voted in lockstep. For example, we clas-
sified the BlackRock fund family as non-substantially centralized. The ten
BlackRock funds in our sample formed three clusters: five funds voted in
lockstep with each other, four others voted in lockstep with each other (and
not in lockstep with the first cluster) and the last fund voted out of lockstep
with the other two clusters, forming a third cluster. Also, in some instances,
lack of overlap among the votes cast by different funds due to the variation
78 If instead a 60% (80%) threshold is used to classify fund families as substantially cen-
tralized, the percentage of sample assets held in substantially centralized funds increases by
2% (decreases by 3.5%).
79 Several fund families could not be classified because the family consisted of a single
fund or because the funds within that family had insufficient overlap in holdings to determine
whether these funds voted in lockstep and the funds at issue accounted for a material portion of
the aggregate fund family assets.
80 Notably our findings differ from those of Rothberg and Lilien who found that “proxies
could be are voted as a block across all the funds of the manager.” Rothberg & Lilien, supra
note 41, at 162. R
81 We also test the difference across all three types of funds and find that the difference is
insignificant (Pearson chi^2(4) = 6.0785; Pr = 0.193.).
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TABLE 1: FUND FAMILY SIZE AND CENTRALIZATION
Non- Substantially FullySubstantially TotalCentralized CentralizedCentralized
Large 3 6 7 16
Medium 2 4 4 10
Small 0 2 10 12
in fund holdings prevented us from determining whether the funds voted in
lockstep. These funds may, in fact, vote in lockstep with each other, but we
lacked sufficient observations to determine so with confidence.
Although we cannot explain the reasons for the difference in degree of
centralization in every case, in some, the reasons are apparent. For example,
the current Franklin Templeton family consists of the (old) Franklin Temple-
ton funds and the Mutual series of funds, formerly owned by Heine Securi-
ties Corporation, which merged into Franklin Templeton in 1996.82 The
funds that were formerly part of the Mutual series vote out of lockstep with
the other Franklin Templeton funds, but in lockstep with each other. To the
extent that large families are more likely to have incorporated predecessor
funds and retained multiple decision making bodies within the overall fund
family, we should expect to see a lesser degree of centralization for reasons
that are independent of the desire to economize.
In the case of Fidelity, variation in fund voting has a different explana-
tion. Fidelity separated the advisory services for its index funds in order to
avoid having their holdings aggregated with the holdings of other Fidelity
funds for purposes of Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.83 Fidelity’s index funds are therefore sub-advised by Geode Capital
Management LLC, and Geode independently makes the voting decisions for
those index funds.84 Our study confirms that Fidelity’s index funds vote out
of lockstep with the other Fidelity funds.
In many other instances, however, no ready explanations for the degree
of centralization or lack thereof are apparent. Differences may be due to the
location within the fund complex at which voting decisions are made. For
example, the voting decisions of a fund family in which the portfolio manag-
ers of individual funds exercise greater control of voting are unlikely to be
82 See Press Release, Franklin Resources, Inc., Franklin Resources, Inc. Merges with
Heine Securities Corporation (Nov. 1, 1996), available at https://www.franklintempleton.com/
retail/pages/corp/press/1996/heine_110196.jsf?archived=true. (describing the merger).
83 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006) (requiring certain registered entities to publically dis-
seminate the security-based swap transaction and pricing data required to be reported).
84 See Robern Farzad, Special Report: Fidelity’s Divided Loyalties, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS-
WEEK (Oct. 15, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-10-15/fidelitys-divided-
loyalties (describing separate voting by Fidelity index funds); Overview of Proxy Voting, FI-
DELITY, http://personal.fidelity.com/myfidelity/InsideFidelity/InvestExpertise/ProxyVoting/
ProxyVotingOverview.shtml (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (stating that Fidelity index funds are
subadvised by Geode Capital Management, LLC, which votes the proxies of those funds).
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centralized. Similarly, decentralization may be more common in fund fami-
lies that do not use a unitary board. We do not explore all potential reasons
in this article.
We do, however, employ our findings about centralization to refine the
manner in which we count fund votes. For the remainder of our analysis, we
treat the funds comprising a cluster as a single fund, reflecting our determi-
nation that the lockstep vote by a cluster represents a single voting decision.
Similarly, when multiple funds in a cluster cast votes on the same director-
nominee, we treat that vote as a single observation and aggregate the assets
of the funds in the cluster.
C. Shortcuts
We next examine the extent to which funds economize on the costs of
voting by relying on short cuts. Commentators have identified two possible
short cuts that mutual funds may use: (1) virtually always following the vot-
ing recommendations by the ISS85 and (2) virtually always following the
voting recommendations of the board of directors (which means, in effect,
voting “for” the board nominees).86 The concern about both is that, by rely-
ing on a short cut, a fund may be neither engaged in independent thinking
nor, necessarily, using its voting power to attempt to maximize the profit-
ability of its portfolio companies. Extensive reliance by mutual funds on
short cuts may frustrate the role of shareholder voting as a corporate govern-
ance mechanism. This concern is of particular significance in the context of
director elections because shareholders’ ability to elect the board is perhaps
their most important protection against improper management behavior.87
The possibility that funds routinely follow management recommenda-
tions suggests the risk that shareholders are not using their voting power to
elect a board capable of exercising effective management oversight. Funds’
reluctance to challenge management may be the product of (1) a judgment
that the costs of an informed voting decision outweigh the benefits to fund
investors, (2) an effort by funds to free ride on the informed voting by other
shareholders, or (3) a desire not to antagonize management of portfolio com-
panies (e.g., in order not to jeopardize relationships between fund analysts
and those managers or other business relationships between the fund man-
85 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why Should ISS Be The New Master Of The Corporate Gov-
ernance Universe? CORP. GOVERNANCE, Jan. 4, 2006, at 14–15 (describing how SEC regula-
tion of mutual fund voting has driven mutual funds “into the arms of ISS”); Tamara C.
Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for Increased
Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 386 (2009) (stating that “15–20% of
mutual funds have even authorized ISS to automatically vote their shares however it sees fit
. . . .”)
86 See, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 11. R
87 See, e.g., Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(“matters involving the integrity of the shareholder voting process involve consideration not
present in any other context in which directors exercise delegated power.”).
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agement company and the portfolio company). Depending on the reason,
such voting may or may not be in the interest of fund investors. In contrast,
we do not believe that this voting pattern simply reflects the same confi-
dence in management that motivated the funds’ investment decision. After
all, funds sometimes decide to sell stock when they decide that they no
longer have such confidence.88 If they are in the process of divesting them-
selves, they should not automatically vote in accordance with management
recommendations.
The possibility that funds routinely follow ISS recommendations raises
different issues. Many commentators have expressed concerns about the po-
tential influence that ISS exercises over corporate elections, a concern that
we will explore in more detail below.89 The potential effect of an ISS short
cut is to grant substantial power over voting results to an unregulated entity
with no equity stake in the portfolio companies that it analyzes.
We approach the analysis of short cuts with caution. The vast majority
of mutual fund votes, more than 90%, are cast “for” the director nominee.
During the period of our study, ISS recommended a “for” vote for 93.2% of
the directors in our sample. As a result, there is likely to be a substantial
correlation between mutual fund votes, management recommendations and
ISS recommendations. In addition, we note that our tests measure correla-
tion, not causation. To the extent that ISS attempts to formulate its voting
policies to incorporate the preferences of its institutional investor subscrib-
ers,90 its recommendations will naturally correlate substantially with, but not
necessarily cause, voting decisions that are the result of those underlying
preferences.91
We first consider the extent to which fund clusters employ an ISS short
cut. We view a fund as employing an ISS short cut if the fund votes in
accordance with the ISS recommendation in 99.5% or more of its votes.
Given the high correlation between ISS “for” recommendations and fund
“for” votes due to factors other than the influence of ISS, we utilize a 99.5%
threshold to measure whether a fund cluster in fact is using ISS as a short cut
in voting. Of the 127 clusters in our sample, we find that 10 virtually always
follow ISS, voting in accordance with the ISS recommendation in 99.5% or
88 See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Mutual Funds: What You Need to Know, N.Y. Times
(Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/your-money/mutual-funds-and-etfs/pri
mermutualfunds.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that “kicking the tires” by meeting with
management is one of the ways that portfolio managers choose which companies to invest in).
89 See, e.g., Belinfanti, supra note 85, at 387, 438. R
90 See Policy Formulation and Application, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS SERVICE, http:/
/www.issgovernance.com/policy/process (last visited Aug. 15, 2011) (explaining that annual
survey of institutional investors is part of the process by which ISS formulates its voting
policies).
91 See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 882–85 (discussing possible explanations for correlation R
between ISS recommendations and voting outcomes).
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more of their votes, and that another 26 appear to follow ISS to a lesser
degree.92
We then study the propensity of funds to employ a management short
cut. Because many factors can lead a fund to vote “for” in addition to the
management’s recommendation to vote “for”, we focus on situations where
ISS recommends “withhold” as a proxy for a situation where other factors
may cause a fund to vote “withhold”. We treat a fund that continues to
follow management’s recommendation to vote “for” even in these circum-
stances as following a management short cut. To gauge the strength with
which a fund follows management, we compare a fund cluster’s actual
“withhold” rate to the frequency of an ISS “withhold” recommendation for
directors. We term this frequency the “relative ‘withhold’ rate.” Focusing in
particular on very low relative “withhold” rates, we find that 13 fund clus-
ters have a relative “withhold” rate of less than 0.1, which translates roughly
into an absolute “withhold” rate of 0.6% or less. Another 5 fund clusters
have a relative “withhold” rate of less than 0.2. In total, 54 of the 127 clus-
ters appear to follow some sort of short cut.93
Next we consider separately the largest cluster in each fund family as
measured by asset size (termed the “dominant” cluster). Within this group
of 56 dominant clusters, we find that seven clusters vote in accordance with
the ISS recommendation more than 99.5% of the time and an additional
eight vote in accordance with ISS recommendations to a lesser degree.94
Eight dominant clusters have a relative “withhold” rate of less than 0.1 and
four more have a relative “withhold” rate below 0.2. Overall 27 of 56 domi-
nant clusters appear to utilize some type of short cut.
To the extent that short cuts are a means of economizing on the cost of
voting, we would expect to see greater use of short cuts within smaller fund
families. We confirm this hypothesis with our data on dominant clusters.
Among small fund families, 12 of 18 used a short cut, among medium sized
of 10 of 19, but among large only 5 of 19. The difference in the proclivity to
92 These funds either follow ISS “for” recommendations in at least 99.95% of the votes
(but not ISS “withhold” vote recommendations to the same degree), follow ISS “withhold”
recommendations in at least 99.95% of the votes (but not ISS “withhold” vote recommenda-
tions to the same degree), or vote in accordance with ISS recommendations more than 99% of
the time.
93 In unreported tests we examined whether business ties or conflicts of interest are associ-
ated with use of shortcuts. Of the 56 fund families in our sample, 28 are affiliated with other
financial firms such as commercial and investment banks or insurance companies; 28 are inde-
pendent. We studied the “withhold” rates as well as the use of shortcuts, both for dominant
clusters and for all funds. We found no statistically significant difference in the voting behav-
ior of affiliated versus independent firms.
94 Five dominant fund clusters follow ISS “for” vote recommendations in at least 99.95%
of the votes (but not ISS “withhold” vote recommendations to the same degree); 1 follows ISS
“withhold” vote recommendations in at least 99.95% of the votes (but not ISS “for” vote
recommendations to the same degree); and 2 more funds vote according to the ISS recommen-
dation in over 99% of the votes.
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use short cuts for fund families of different sizes is statistically significant
(Pearson chi2(2) = 4.9350; Pr = 0.085).
Our finding that smaller fund families rely more heavily on short cuts
suggested an alternative way to measure the influence of ISS. Rather than
examining the percentage of funds that vote in accordance with an ISS rec-
ommendation, we considered the percentage of underlying assets in our sam-
ple reflected in the vote. Table 2 gives some information on the assets and
the percentage of the aggregate sample assets for funds that vote in accor-
dance with ISS recommendations.
TABLE 2: FUND VOTING AND ISS RECOMMENDATIONS
PercentageAssetsFund Cluster Category of Assets($ millions) in Sample
Fund votes that follow ISS >.99 76,632 3.04%
Fund votes that follow ISS > .975 255,874 10.16%
Fund votes that follow ISS > .95 478,701 19.00%
Fund WH votes conditional on ISS WH rec. > .90 80,664 3.20%
Fund WH votes conditional on ISS WH rec. > .80 203,345 8.07%
Fund WH votes conditional on ISS WH rec. > .70 208,719 8.28%
Fund WH votes that follow ISS/total fund WH votes > .90 177,764 7.06%
Fund WH votes that follow ISS/total fund WH votes > .80 334,244 13.27%
Fund clusters that follow ISS with respect to more than 99% of all ISS
recommendations account for a mere 3.04% of the sample assets. Funds that
follow ISS with respect to 97.5% of all ISS recommendations account for
only 10.16% of the sample assets. Two caveats are important. First, we are
measuring overlap, not causation. Second, because most ISS recommenda-
tions are in favor of the director nominees and most votes are cast in favor of
the director nominees, the degree of correlation is less significant than it
initially appears. A fund that always voted “for” would vote in accordance
with the ISS recommendations in about 94% of all cases, even though such a
fund’s votes would presumably be completely independent of the ISS
recommendation.
Because of the large percentage of ISS “for” recommendations and
fund “for” votes, it is perhaps more valuable to examine the relationship
between “withhold” recommendations and votes. As reported in Table 2, we
find that fund clusters that vote “withhold” at least 90% of the time in cir-
cumstances where ISS recommended a “withhold” vote account for 3.20%
of the sample assets. For fund clusters accounting for 8.07% of the sample
assets, the corresponding probability is at least 80%; for fund clusters ac-
counting for 8.28% of the sample assets, the corresponding probability is at
least 70%.
Lastly, we look at how important “withhold” votes that correlate with
an ISS “withhold” recommendation are relative to the total number of
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“withhold” votes cast by a particular fund cluster. If ISS is influential to the
voting of a particular fund cluster, we expect that this ratio will be high.
Conversely, a fund that casts “withhold” votes frequently when ISS does
not recommend “withhold” will have a low ratio. As reported in Table 2, we
find 7.06% of total sample assets are in the category of fund clusters where
the “withhold” votes that correlate with ISS “withhold” recommendations
correspond to 90% or more of the total “withhold” votes. Likewise, we find
that 13.27% of total sample assets are in the category of fund clusters where
the “withhold” votes that correlate with ISS “withhold” recommendations
correspond to 80% or more of the total “withhold” votes.
Table 3 summarizes the relative difference in importance between ISS
“for” recommendations and “withhold” recommendations, a difference that
highlights the extent to which data showing the degree of overlap between
“for” recommendations and “for” votes may overstate the influence of ISS.
We note that both the average and asset-weighted correspondence between
mutual fund votes and ISS recommendations is much higher for the “for”
votes which, in turn, represents the vast majority of director elections. Turn-
ing to “withhold” votes, ISS recommends “withhold” for only 6.8% of di-
rector candidates and, on an asset-weighted basis, those recommendations
are followed by only 26.5% of all mutual funds. Thus when ISS recom-
mends withholding a vote for a particular director an average of 73.5% of
mutual fund votes are cast in opposition to that recommendation.
TABLE 3: CORRESPONDENCE OF “FOR” AND “WITHHOLD” VOTES
Average Asset-weighted
Fund “for” and ISS “for” 94% 95.6%
Fund WH and ISS WH 47% 26.5%
(Overall ISS recommendations are 93.2% “for” and 6.8% “withhold”)
Although our data do not support the claim that most mutual funds
blindly follow an ISS recommendation, they do suggest that ISS has the
effect of focusing funds on potentially problematic elections. To measure
this focal point effect, we calculated the correlation in voting among ISS and
the dominant clusters of the 19 large fund families in our sample. The corre-
lation was significant and positive between ISS and 17 of the clusters. In
comparison the average number of significant correlations between any one
cluster and the 18 other clusters was 11.4. The average correlation between
ISS and the dominant clusters of only large fund families was also signifi-
cantly higher than the average correlation among the clusters.95 These results
95 This being said, four clusters had a higher average correlation with the other clusters
than with ISS—the families were Alliance Bernstein, Hartford, Morgan Stanley and T. Rowe
Price—and one family (T. Rowe Price) had a number of significant correlations equivalent to
ISS. These four clusters generally voted similarly, but only two of them were characterized as
following an ISS shortcut. The other two families—T. Rowe Price and Morgan Stanley—had a
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show that, although funds often vote heterogeneously on any particular di-
rector candidate, in those circumstances in which many large funds are vot-
ing the same way, that vote generally corresponds with the ISS
recommendation. We return to the focal point effect of an ISS “withhold”
recommendation in Part IV below.
To put ISS’s influence further in perspective, we compare the assets
held by funds that have a strong tendency of following ISS with the assets
held by funds that have adopted a “follow management” short cut. Funds
that have a relative “withhold” rate of less than 0.1 (our measurement of a
“follow management” short cut), which translates roughly into an absolute
“withhold” rate of 0.6% or less, account for 24% of the sample’s aggregate
assets, and funds with a relative “withhold” rate of less than 0.2% account
for 27% of the aggregate assets. Compare this with the 3.04% of the sam-
ple’s aggregate assets that follow ISS recommendations more than 99% or
10.16% of assets that follow ISS recommendations more than 97.5% of the
time as reported in Table 2. From the perspective of economic significance,
blindly following ISS appears to be less of a concern for the funds in our
sample than blindly following management.96
III. HOW THE LARGEST FUNDS VOTE
Three mutual fund complexes—Vanguard, Fidelity, and American
funds—tower over all other funds in terms of assets under management.97
Each of them had more than $1 trillion under management during
2005–2006, accounting for about 20% of the total assets in our sample.98
Together, these three families accounted for 34% of aggregate mutual fund
assets during our sample period. Thus, as far as mutual funds are concerned,
these three major families control at least as many votes, and probably more,
than those that strictly follow ISS.
The factors that influence the voting decisions of these three fund com-
plexes are thus of particular interest. Notably, all Vanguard and American
funds vote fully or virtually fully in lockstep, as does the dominant cluster of
Fidelity funds (the non-index funds), which accounts for 90% of Fidelity’s
aggregate assets.
similar overall “withhold” rate as did ISS, but declined to follow ISS “withhold” recommen-
dations in, respectively, 16% and 37% of all cases and their “withhold” votes that did not
follow ISS accounted for, respectively, 12% and 22% of their total “withhold” votes.
96 Indeed, we note that the fifth largest fund family in our sample, Dodge & Cox, had a
“withhold” rate of zero.
97 By comparison, the next largest fund family, Franklin Templeton, is roughly one-third
the size of these three, and its dominant cluster accounts for only 72% of its assets.
98 Data on mutual fund asset holdings as of March 31, 2007, provided by Mr. Erin H.
Short, Senior Research Associate, Statistical Research, Investment Company Institute.  For
more information on our methodology, see supra note 68.  Total US mutual fund assets as of
Dec. 31, 2006 were approximately $10.4 trillion. INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY IN-
STITUTE 2007 FACT BOOK, Section 1, Table 3, available at http://www.icifactbook.org/2007/
data/07_fb_table03.xls.
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To see how specific director and company attributes99 related to the
probability of a “withhold” vote, we tabulated the fund complexes’ votes for
directors along several attributes identified in our prior research, such as
being a new director, being a director candidate over the age of 75 or being a
director at a company that pays abnormally high executive compensation.100
We then calculated whether the probability that a director with a certain
attribute received a “withhold” vote from a certain fund complex (e.g., Van-
guard) was significantly higher or lower than the average probability of a
“withhold” vote for that specific complex. Tables A1 to A3 in the Appendix
report the summary statistics.
We divided the attributes into several categories and subcategories as
follows: audit/disclosure-related attributes (AuditMbr, Prior Restat, Prior
SEC); compensation-related attributes (CompMbr, Top5AbComp); board-re-
lated attributes with the following subcategories: board effectiveness (At-
tendance, ManyBds, Age75); board composition (NomMbr), board
independence (Empl_Dir, OutDirLink, Interlock), and board responsiveness
(IP No – shareholder proposal ignored); takeover related attributes (ClassBd,
CumVote, Poison Pill, and Golden Parachute); performance related attributes
(Top5AbRet and Bot5Abret); and uncategorized attributes (New Director,
CEO, and ISS recommendation).101
We then ran logistic regressions for the Vanguard, American, and Fidel-
ity non-index fund clusters using company-director-year level data (e.g.,
how the Vanguard funds voted for a specific director at a specific company
in a particular year form one data point in the Vanguard fund cluster logistic
model). The dependent variable in the models is the specific fund cluster’s
voting decision (either “for” = 1 or “withhold” = 0). In each logistic re-
gression model, we included the above attributes and other factors as inde-
pendent variables. Errors are clustered by company in the models. The
results are shown in Tables A4 to A6 in the appendix.
A. Vanguard
Vanguard cast “withhold” votes for about 10% of the director candi-
dates on which it voted. The summary statistics (see Appendix, Table A1)
indicate that Vanguard was significantly more likely to “withhold” its vote
from members of compensation or nominating committees and significantly
less likely to “withhold” its vote from CEOs, other directors who are com-
pany employees, non-executive chairmen, and new directors.102
99 See the Appendix for definitions of the attributes.
100 In prior research, we have shown that most of the attributes affect the voting recom-
mendations of proxy advisors and the shareholder vote. See Choi et al., supra note 22, at R
669–70.
101 See the Appendix for definitions of the variables.
102 We caution, however, that these variables are correlated (e.g., the CEO is ordinarily not
a member of the compensation committee).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\3-1\HLB103.txt unknown Seq: 23 20-JUN-13 13:40
2013] Who Calls the Shots? 57
Of 1,435 Vanguard “withhold” votes, 1,087 (over 75%) were cast
against members of a company’s compensation committee even though such
directors account for only 39% of the nominee pool. This strongly suggests
that a large fraction of Vanguard’s “withhold” votes are driven by compen-
sation-related matters for which Vanguard holds members of the compensa-
tion committee responsible. Consistent with this focus on compensation,
Vanguard is also significantly more likely to cast a “withhold” vote against
board members of companies that paid abnormally high compensation, and
even more likely to cast a “withhold” vote against the members of the com-
pensation committees of such companies.
Other factors that are associated with a Vanguard “withhold” vote in
the univariate analysis are failure to attend at least 75% of the board meet-
ings, being an outside-linked director, and bottom 5% abnormal return. By
contrast, membership on many boards, ignoring shareholder proposals, and
having a poison pill or a golden parachute are associated with a reduction in
the probability of a Vanguard “withhold” vote.
Although we classified Vanguard as voting independently, Vanguard’s
votes are significantly correlated with the ISS recommendations. Vanguard
followed 91% of the ISS “for” recommendations and 40% of the ISS “with-
hold” recommendations. We note that this degree of correlation does not
mean that Vanguard follows an ISS shortcut. Indeed, Vanguard rejected a
majority (60%) of ISS’s “withhold” recommendations. Perhaps more signif-
icantly, Vanguard reached an independent decision with respect to three-
quarters of its “withhold” votes—76% of Vanguard’s “withhold” votes were
cast on directors for whom ISS recommended a “for” vote. Vanguard thus
does not follow ISS blindly, or even usually, but instead regularly departs
from ISS recommendations.
The company-director-year vote logistic regressions using the Vanguard
vote as the dependent variable (see Appendix, Table A4) confirm the impor-
tance of compensation-related factors for Vanguard’s voting decisions. We
first consider model (1), which includes the variables from the univariate
analysis of Appendix Table A1 as independent variables, except that it does
not include the ISS recommendation as an independent variable. The vari-
ables for CompMbr and Top5AbComp are significant, at the 1% and 5%
levels, respectively, and of large absolute magnitude. At the mean level for
the other variables, membership on the compensation committee and high
compensation are estimated to increase the probability of a Vanguard “with-
hold” vote by, respectively, 16% and 6%. The large coefficient estimate for
membership on a compensation committee is of particular interest since
there is nothing per se problematic about such membership. (In contrast,
other variables, such as non-attendance at board meetings, prior restatement,
and even an ISS “withhold” recommendation, are per se indicators of some
problem.) The large coefficient estimate indicates not only that compensa-
tion-related factors are important for Vanguard, but also that a large percent-
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age of compensation committee members do not live up to Vanguard’s
standards.
Other variables that are associated with an increased probability of a
Vanguard “withhold” vote are OutDirLink, Empl_Dir, and Attendance, each
at the 1% level. At the mean level for the other variables, these factors are
estimated to increase the probability of a “withhold” vote by, respectively,
22%, 11% and 62%. Being a member of the nominating or audit committee
is also associated with an increased probability of a “withhold” vote, but the
later are significant only at the 10% level, and they have only a marginal
quantitative effect on the probability of a Vanguard “withhold” vote. In con-
trast, New Director, Chairman Only, and Top5AbRet significantly reduce the
probability of a “withhold” vote (at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively). Of the takeover-related attributes, having a classified board in-
creases, but having a poison pill reduces, the probability of a “withhold”
vote.
In model (2), the added variable for the ISS recommendation is highly
significant, reflecting, as noted above, the correlation between Vanguard
votes and ISS recommendations. The quantitative impact, while important, is
not overwhelming. At the mean level for the other variables, an ISS “with-
hold” recommendation increases the probability of a Vanguard “withhold”
vote by 14% (compared to 51% for failure to attend at least 75% of the
board meetings, 16% for being an outside-linked director, and 15% for being
a member on the compensation committee (all from model (2)). The inclu-
sion of the ISS variable has little effect on the significance of the other vari-
ables except that Top5AbRet, which was borderline significant in model (1),
is now borderline insignificant and IP No is now associated with a signifi-
cant (at the 5% level) reduction in the probability of a “withhold” vote.103
In sum, our analysis demonstrates the substantial degree to which Van-
guard makes its voting decisions independently. Compensation is a critical
factor in Vanguard’s analysis, and Vanguard does not appear to withhold
votes based primarily on an issuer’s corporate governance characteristics.
103 In our assessment, this does not signify that Vanguard prefers directors who ignore
shareholder proposals that receive majority support, but rather reflects Vanguard’s selective
approach to ISS “withhold” recommendations. As we have shown elsewhere, IP No is a pow-
erful factor in explaining ISS “withhold” recommendations. However, the summary statistics
and the regression in model (1) indicate that IP No does not explain Vanguard “withhold”
votes. Likewise, while Vanguard may heed ISS “withhold” recommendations (or indepen-
dently arrive at the same conclusions as ISS) with respect to some reasons for “withhold”
votes, Vanguard does not follow ISS “withhold” recommendations that are based on the com-
pany’s ignoring a shareholder proposal. In model (2), this is reflected in the significant nega-
tive coefficient for the ISS recommendation and the significant positive coefficient (or similar
magnitude) for IP No, which balance each other out for ISS “withhold” recommendations
issued because the director ignored a shareholder proposal.
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B. The American Funds
The American Funds group was classified above as employing a man-
agement shortcut. The American Funds cast “withhold” votes in a mere 16
of over 4,000 director elections, a “withhold” rate of 0.4%.104 A substantial
number of the very rare “withhold” votes by American are with respect to
directors on companies that restated their financial statements. As shown in
the summary statistics, over half (9 of 16) of the “withhold” votes relate to
directors at such companies, even though these directors account for only
10% of the director nominees on which American cast a vote. If a company
restated its financials, a director’s membership on the audit committee did
not further increase the probability of a “withhold” vote.
The summary statistics point to no other identifiable explanatory factor
for the American Funds’ “withhold” votes. Notably, neither Attendance nor
OutDirLink—which we have shown elsewhere are important factors in ex-
plaining both “withhold” recommendations by ISS and shareholder voting
overall105—appears to affect the voting of the American Fund complex.106 In
addition, in the univariate analysis, the ISS recommendation has no impact
on the vote by the American Funds.
In the company-director-year vote logistic regressions using the Ameri-
can Funds vote as the dependent variable (see Appendix, Table A5), as one
would expect, the coefficient for Prior Restat is highly significant and, in
absolute magnitude, dwarfs all of the other coefficient estimates. While the
interaction variable Prior Restat x AuditMbr is significant and negative, the
variable for AuditMbr is of similar magnitude and significantly positive.
This means that, given a restatement, being a member of the audit committee
does not further increase the probability of a “withhold” vote. In addition,
and somewhat counterintuitively, being a new director increases the
probability of a “withhold” vote.107 Albeit statistically significant in absolute
terms, the effects of being a member of the audit committee and being a new
director are trivial. When we add the variable for the ISS recommendation,108
the significance levels of these other variables do not change, and the ISS
variable itself is insignificant.
In sum, our analysis demonstrates that the American Funds rarely
choose to withhold their votes in director elections.  The presence of a prior
restatement is a critical factor in the few instances where the American
Funds do vote “Withhold”.
104 See Appendix, Table A2.
105 See Choi et al., supra note 22 at 674–75. R
106 These factors, as shown above, also have a significant impact on Vanguard’s voting.
107 We document elsewhere that new directors are substantially less likely to receive
“withhold” recommendations from ISS. See Choi et al., supra note 22, at 673. R
108 See Appendix, Table A5 model (2).
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C. Fidelity
As noted above, Fidelity funds vote in two separate clusters. Most Fi-
delity funds, other than the index funds, vote in lockstep with each other and
form the dominant Fidelity cluster. Collectively, these funds represent 90%
of the equity assets under management by the Fidelity group. The second
cluster consists of the Fidelity index funds, which also vote in lockstep with
each other, but differently from the dominant Fidelity cluster. This cluster
comprises the remaining 10% of equity assets under management by the
Fidelity group.
Our analysis here concerns only the dominant Fidelity cluster (the non-
index funds). Fidelity’s “withhold” rate for that cluster was about 3%. In the
summary statistics,109 factors associated with an increased probability of a
“withhold” vote included audit-related factors (Prior Restat, Prior SEC, as
well as the interaction variables Prior Restat x AuditMbr and Prior SEC x
AuditMbr), Empl_Dir, Age75, and three takeover-related factors (ClassBd,
Poison Pill, and Golden Parachute). Curiously, our variable for low abnor-
mal return (Bot5AbRet) was associated with a reduced probability of a
“withhold” vote. Fidelity funds were also slightly more likely to “withhold”
their vote on directors when ISS recommended a “withhold” vote (4.4%)
than when ISS recommended a “for” vote (2.9%).
As to the company-director-year vote logistic regression, using the Fi-
delity non-index fund vote as the dependent variable, our explanatory vari-
ables do a relatively poor job in explaining Fidelity’s voting behavior (see
Appendix, Table A6). This is reflected, for one, in the low pseudo r-squared
of the logistic regressions (0.082 and 0.084 depending on the model).110 For
comparison, the respective pseudo r-squares are 0.243 and 0.270 for Van-
guard and 0.277 and 0.282 for American. This suggests that Fidelity’s voting
decisions, to a substantially greater extent than Vanguard’s and American’s,
are affected by factors not accounted for in our analysis.
Taking a closer look at the independent variables, in model (1) (without
the ISS variable) prior restatements increase the probability of a Fidelity
“withhold” vote for members of the audit committee, as does being an em-
ployee director. In addition, one takeover-related factor (Golden Parachute)
increases the probability of a “withhold” vote. As with the American Funds,
Attendance, IP No and OutDirLink are not significant. Model (2) yields
equivalent results, and the ISS recommendation is insignificant. We con-
clude that Fidelity’s voting decisions are independent, but eclectic.
109 See Appendix, Table A3.
110 R-squared is a variable that measures the fraction of the variation in the dependent
variable—i.e. Fidelity voting decision—that is explained by the independent variables.
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D. Comparison of Large Fund Voting with Overall Shareholder Voting
and ISS Recommendations
In our earlier articles, we examined the factors that determine the over-
all percentage “for” vote directors received in election as well as the factors
that determine the ISS voting recommendations. Our analysis here of the
voting by the Vanguard, American and Fidelity fund complexes enables us to
compare the voting behavior of these large institutional investors with each
other as well as with the votes of shareholders overall and the ISS
recommendations.
Table 4 below summarizes how these factors affect the voting decision.
Two results stand out. First, the three large mutual fund families differ from
each other not only in the overall “withhold” rate, but also in the factors that
determine “withhold” votes. Second, the factors that affect overall voting
outcomes correspond more closely to the factors that affect the ISS recom-
mendation than to the factors that affect the voting decisions by Vanguard,
American and Fidelity. This is true even if we control for the ISS recommen-
dation itself in examining the factors that affect the voting outcome. The
latter finding supports the conclusion in our earlier article that ISS is more in
tune with voter sentiments at large than other market participants.111
Looking at the three large fund families individually, the factors that
affect Vanguard’s vote are very similar to the factors that affect ISS recom-
mendations and, to a lesser extent, the factors that affect voting decisions.
The most important difference is the dramatic effect of compensation-related
matters on Vanguard’s vote. For Vanguard, being a member of the compensa-
tion committee raises the probability of a “withhold” vote by 16%, from
roughly 5% to 21%. For ISS, the corresponding increase is a mere 2%. Im-
portantly, 39% of all nominees for which Vanguard cast a vote were mem-
bers of a compensation committee. Because the number of nominees who
serve on a compensation committee is so high, such membership has a much
larger effect on Vanguard’s vote than the (relatively) larger increase in
“withhold” vote probability for the few (0.7% of director pool) directors
who missed more than 25% of the board meetings.
A second notable difference is that Vanguard did not hold it against
board members if they ignored a shareholder proposal that received majority
support. In contrast, ignoring a shareholder proposal vastly increases the
probability of an ISS “withhold” recommendation (by 42%) and is also as-
sociated with an approximately 2% decline in the overall “for” vote beyond
the average effect of an ISS recommendation. This factor, however, affects
only about 1% of the director nominees in the sample.
The American Funds complex differs from both ISS and voters at large
(and, for that matter, from Vanguard and Fidelity) in its level of support for
the company’s nominees. Even in the rare cases where the American Funds
111 See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 1, at 906. R
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TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF FACTORS AFFECTING VOTES AND ISS
RECOMMENDATION
Aggregate Aggregate Fidelity Fidelity
Vanguard Vanguard American American
ISS Vote Vote Vote Vote
Factor Category Vote Exc. Vote Inc. Vote Exc. Vote Inc.
Rec. Outcome Outcome Exc. Inc.
ISS ISS ISS ISS
Exc. ISS Inc. ISS ISS ISS
CEO -*** -*** -***
New Dir. +*** +*** +*** +** +**
Audit Audit -*** -*** -* -*
PriorRestat Audit -*** -***
PriorSEC Audit -*** -***
CompMbr Comp. -*** -*** -*** —*** —***
Top5Ab
Comp. -* -** -**
Comp
Board –
Attendance —*** —*** —*** —*** —***Effect.
Board –
ManyBds -*** -*** -***
Effect.
Board –
Age75 -*** -***
Effect.
Board –
NomMbr -*** -*** -*** -***
Comp.
Board –
Empl_Dir —*** —*** -*** —*** -*** -** -**Indep.
Board –
OutDirLink —*** —*** -*** —*** —*** +**Indep.
Chairman
+** +** +**
Only
Board –
IP No —*** —*** -*** +**Respon.
ClassBd Takeover -** -*** -*** -** -**
Poison Pill Takeover +** +**
CumVote Takeover -*
Golden
Takeover +*** -* -*
Parachute
Top5AbRet Performance +** +** +*
Bot5AbRet Performance -** -***
*, **, *** signify statistical significance of the factor at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
“ISS Rec.” is from a model with the ISS recommendation (For or WH) as the dependent variable. See Choi et al., supra (USC
Paper). “Aggregate Vote Outcome Exc. ISS” is from a model with the log odds of the total “for” vote as a fraction of all votes cast
as the dependent variable without VoteISS (the ISS recommendation) as an independent variable. “Aggregate Vote Outcome Inc.
ISS” is the same as “Aggregate Vote Outcome Exc. ISS” but including VoteISS as an independent variable. See Choi et al., supra
(Emory). The Vanguard, American, and Fidelity regressions use the respective fund’s vote as the dependent variable and are
reported in Appendix Tables A4 to A6.
+, - signify direction. ++, — signify a larger quantitative impact. In the non-outcome regressions, we considered an impact large
if it was statistically significant and our quantitative estimate at the median for other factors was either (i) at least 10% or (ii) at least
5% and the factor was present for at least 10% of the nominees. Statistically significant factors with a quantitative impact of less
than 1% are omitted. In the outcome regressions, we treated an impact as large if it was associated with a coefficient of greater than
1.
“withhold” their vote from a nominee, the factor we identify is distinctive in
that the presence of a prior restatement neither affects the ISS recommenda-
tion nor the voting outcome at large.
As to Fidelity, the most notable observation is that its analysis is per-
sistently independent. Factors related to compensation, board governance,
and performance—important to ISS, Vanguard, and voters at large—have
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little or no impact on Fidelity. For that matter, none of the other factors we
identify have a large effect on Fidelity’s voting. We conclude that factors that
we did not include in our analysis affect Fidelity’s voting decision. Although
we cannot pinpoint Fidelity’s analysis from the factors we consider here, as
we observe in the next Part, that analysis contains an important element that
appears to contain substantial power, beyond the ISS recommendation, in
explaining high numbers of “withhold” votes.
IV. WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH “WITHHOLD” VOTES?
Although particular investors may withhold votes for a variety of rea-
sons, high “withhold” votes are of particular concern because they signal
widespread investor concern about the company.112 The data that we have
collected enables us to look more carefully at directors who receive high
“withhold” votes and the factors associated with those votes. For purposes
of this examination, we define a high “withhold” vote as a “withhold” vote
of 30% or more of the votes cast.113 During 2005–2006, 276 directors in our
sample received high “withhold” votes.114 Table 5 below provides informa-
tion about directors who received a high “withhold” vote.
For the entire set of directors in our sample, the probability of getting a
high “withhold” vote is 2% (High WH Vote/Pool Column (1)). For directors
who received an ISS “withhold” recommendation, the probability of a high
“withhold” vote jumps to 30% (High WH Vote/Pool Column (2)). More
significantly, directors who received an ISS “withhold” recommendation ac-
count for 95% of the directors who received a high “withhold” vote (High
WH Vote for Specific Category/Total High WH Vote for All Directors Col-
umn (2)). Correspondingly, for directors who did not receive an ISS “with-
hold” recommendation, the probability of a high “withhold” vote drops to
0.1%. The data strongly supports our previously discussed hypothesis that
ISS recommendations have the effect of focusing investors on potentially
problematic directors or companies.
112 See, e.g., WILKIE, FARR & GALLAGHER, “JUST VOTE NO” CAMPAIGNS IN UNCONTESTED
DIRECTOR ELECTIONS—RENEWED VITALITY FOR THE 2010 PROXY SEASON 1 (2009), available
at http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C3113%5CJust%
20Vote%20No%20Campaigns.pdf (“By achieving a compelling ‘withhold’ vote . . . the cam-
paign seeks to send a strong message to the company’s board of directors that shareholders are
dissatisfied with some aspect of governance, management or corporate strategy.”).
113 Cf. QUINTON HUCKEBY, ELECTIONS THAT MATTER: A REVIEW OF DIRECTOR VOTES IN
2008 1 (2008), available at http://www.directorsandboards.com/DBEBRIEFING/November
2008/AReviewofDirectorVotesin2008FINAL.pdf; (defining as “high” a “withhold” vote of
20% or more); Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery & Tracie Woidtkeb, Do Boards Pay Attention
When Institutional Investor Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84, 89 (2008) (describ-
ing “withhold” votes of more than 20% as “substantial”).
114 We note that high “withhold” votes are increasing in frequency. See, e.g., Huckeby,
supra note 113, at 1 (stating that 5–6% of directors received a “withhold” vote of 20% or R
more in 2007).
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TABLE 5: OVER 30% “WITHHOLD” VOTES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (3)–(6)
All ISS WH ISS WH ISS WH + ISS WH ISS + Combined
Directors + Fidelity Attendance + Share- Vangd.
WH holder WH +
Resolution Outside-
Linked
Director
Number of Directors 13,159 887 29 40 52 174 281
(Pool)
High WH Vote 276 262 23 24 18 69 134
High WH Vote / Pool 0.02 0.30 0.79 0.60 0.35 0.40 0.48
High WH Vote for the 1.00 0.95 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.25 0.49
Specific Category /
Total High WH Vote
for All Directors
High WH Vote tabulates the number of directors that received a “withhold” vote of 30% or more of the votes
cast. High WH Votes for the Specific Category is the number of directors that received a “withhold” vote of
30% or more of the votes cast for a specific category (such as Column (2) in the table) and Total High WH Vote
for All Directors is the number of all directors that received a “withhold” vote of 30% or more of the votes cast.
The (3)–(6) combined column includes directors who meet the criteria of at least one of columns (3) through (6).
Although an ISS “withhold” recommendation is a significant factor in
predicting a high “withhold” vote, it is not as powerful as the commentary
about ISS might suggest. Note that even those directors who receive an ISS
“withhold” recommendation have a 70% probability of not receiving a high
“withhold” vote (or 1 - High WH Vote/Pool Column (2)). What else mat-
ters? We analyze specific company and director attributes to identify four
additional factors that significantly enhance our power to predict the inci-
dence of a high “withhold” vote.
Combining an ISS “withhold” recommendation with at least one of
four factors raises the probability of a high “withhold” vote to 49%. Those
factors are (1) a Fidelity “withhold” vote with respect to that director (which
together with a ISS “withhold” recommendation is associated with a 79%
probability of receiving a high “withhold” vote); (2) a director who did not
attend at least 75% of the board meetings (60% probability); (3) being a
director at a company that ignored a shareholder resolution that received
majority support (35% probability); and (4) an outside-linked director for
whom Vanguard cast a “withhold” vote (40% probability).115
Overall, directors in one (or more) of these four groups account for
48% of the directors who received a high “withhold” vote. Directors who, in
addition to receiving an ISS “withhold” recommendation, fall in any one of
the four groups have a 49% probability of receiving a high “withhold” vote.
In comparison, a director who receives an ISS “withhold” recommendation
115 Outside this group, a Vanguard “withhold” vote did not make much difference. Direc-
tors who received an ISS “withhold” recommendation and for whom Vanguard cast a “with-
hold” vote but who are not in one of the four groups had a 18% probability of receiving a high
“withhold” vote, slightly less than the respective directors for whom Vanguard did not cast a
“withhold” vote.
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but is not in one of these groups only has a 21% probability of receiving a
high “withhold” vote. Although this figure is still reasonably high, it is sub-
stantially less than that for a director who combines an ISS “withhold” rec-
ommendation with one of our four additional factors.
If we define a high “withhold” vote more narrowly, as directors receiv-
ing more than 40% or more than 50% “withhold” votes, the pattern becomes
even stronger, as indicated in Table 6 below.
TABLE 6: PROBABILITY OF HIGH “WITHHOLD” VOTE
ISS WH plusISS WH only at least one of four factors
WH vote > 30% 21.0% 48.0%
WH vote > 40% 7.0% 19.0%
WH vote > 50% 0.5% 5.0%
Directors who receive an ISS “withhold” recommendation and who are
in at least one of the four groups account, respectively, for 56% and 81% of
the pool of directors who received in excess of 40% or in excess of 50%
“withhold” votes. For directors who are within one of the groups, the
probability of receiving a 40% or more or 50% or more “withhold” vote is,
respectively, 19% and 5%. For directors who receive an ISS “withhold”
recommendation but who are not in one of the groups, the probability of
receiving such a high “withhold” vote is significantly lower (7% and 0.5%,
respectively).
Our findings indicate that the four factors we have identified, in con-
junction with ISS recommendations, have substantial explanatory power in
predicting whether a director receives a high “withhold” vote. An adverse
ISS recommendation that is not combined with one of the factors increases
the probability of receiving a high “withhold” vote by a factor of 5 to 10.
The presence of one of the factors on top of the ISS recommendation in-
creases the probability of a high “withhold” vote by a further factor of 2.5 to
10.
The higher the definition of what constitutes a high “withhold” vote,
the less important the ISS recommendation is on its own and the more im-
portant is the presence of one of the additional factors. This finding rein-
forces the suggestion in our prior research that ISS’s recommendations are
influential because they focus shareholder attention, but not because share-
holders follow those recommendations blindly.
It is worth highlighting the fact that the combination of an ISS “with-
hold” recommendation and a Fidelity “withhold” vote (a combination
which is associated with a 79% probability of a high “withhold” vote) is
particularly problematic for directors—much more so than the combination
of an ISS “withhold” recommendation and a Vanguard “withhold” vote
(which is associated with only a 36% probability of a high “withhold” vote).
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As we have discussed earlier, the factors in our model do not explain Fidel-
ity’s voting behavior well, and the correlation between Fidelity’s voting and
ISS recommendation is much lower than the equivalent correlation between
Vanguard and ISS. Thus, ironically, while Fidelity’s voting appears largely
independent from ISS, in the relatively infrequent instances where Fidelity
and ISS agree, the director is in trouble.
Less surprisingly, lack of regular attendance at board meetings is highly
significant in explaining high “withhold” votes. For the >40% and >50%
thresholds for a high “withhold” vote, the combination of an ISS “with-
hold” recommendation and lack of regular attendance was the best predictor
we found for directors receiving a high “withhold” vote.116 Specifically, this
combination raised the background probability of receiving a majority
“withhold” vote by a factor of 100.
Our prior findings and those of other scholars suggested that attendance
is an important factor in explaining both voting outcomes and the recom-
mendations of proxy advisors.117 Importantly, however, lack of attendance is
also relatively easy for shareholders to observe directly because SEC rules
require companies to identify specifically, in the proxy statement itself, any
director who did not attend at least 75% of the board meetings.118 Thus direc-
tor attendance is likely a characteristic for which the information provided
by ISS is of limited value.
The two other factors—ignoring a shareholder resolution (IP No) and
the combination of a Vanguard “withhold” vote and being an outside-linked
director (OutDirLink)—are less strongly associated with a high “withhold”
vote. In our prior studies, we found that ignoring a shareholder resolution is
a strong predictor of an ISS “withhold” recommendation (in fact, a stronger
predictor than lack of attendance)119 and a significant factor in explaining the
vote outcome (though less important than attendance, being an employee
director, or being an outside-linked director).120 Unlike director attendance,
shareholders cannot readily observe whether directors have ignored a prior
shareholder resolution by reviewing the current proxy statement, because the
SEC does not require explicit disclosure of that fact, making the reliance of
ISS on this factor particularly important in its ability to convey new informa-
tion to shareholders.121
116 Lack of regular attendance is also a strong predictor of getting an ISS “withhold”
recommendation. See Choi et al., supra note 22.
117 See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 888–95, 909–912; Choi et al., supra note 22, at R
665–75; Cai et al., supra note 58, at 2402–04. R
118 SEC rules require issuers to disclose the name of each director who attended fewer
than 75% of the meetings of the board and of committees on which he or she sat. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.407(b) (2012).
119 See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 888–95, 909–12; Choi et al., supra note 22, at 665–75. R
120 See id.
121 In our prior work, we found that ignoring a prior shareholder resolution is less of a
factor in explaining voting recommendations of other proxy advisors (in particular for PROXY
Governance Inc. and Glass, Lewis & Company). See Choi et al., supra note 22, at 670–75. We R
also find that ignoring a prior shareholder resolution is generally not relevant in explaining the
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The combination of an ISS “withhold” recommendation, a Vanguard
“withhold” vote and being an outside-linked director is associated with a
surprisingly high probability of a high “withhold” vote—higher than would
seem to be predicted from the separate effects of these factors. Although we
cannot explain this result with our existing data, we surmise that the combi-
nation of these factors is associated with additional factors that we have not
separately identified and that make these directors particularly objectionable
to shareholders.
CONCLUSION
This paper addresses an increasingly important question: what factors
explain the voting of mutual funds? Unlike prior studies, we focus specifi-
cally on uncontested director elections as a particularly clean test of fund
voting behavior. Mindful of the economic and structural realities of mutual
funds, we examine their voting mechanisms as well as their actual voting
decisions, identifying both the degree to which fund families centralize their
voting and the extent to which they employ short cuts to economize on vot-
ing costs.
We find that, although a substantial number of funds employ short cuts,
appearing to presumptively follow the voting recommendations of either
management or ISS, these strategies are more common in smaller fund fami-
lies. On an asset-weighted basis, reliance on management appears to be more
significant than reliance on ISS, and a very small percentage of fund assets
appear to be voted automatically in accordance with ISS recommendations.
Perhaps more importantly, ISS recommendations appear to be most signifi-
cant in focusing investor attention on potentially problematic directors.
We find substantial heterogeneity in mutual fund voting. Although each
of the three largest fund families—Vanguard, Fidelity, and the American
Funds—vote substantially in lockstep, they exhibit significantly different
voting patterns from each other, both in terms of their overall proclivity to
cast “withhold” votes and in terms of the factors explaining these votes.
Finally, we identify four factors that, in conjunction with an ISS “withhold”
recommendation, explain which directors are likely to receive “withhold”
votes in excess of 30%. These findings are of special import for companies
and directors who want to avoid such embarrassingly high “withhold” votes.
Our research documents the use by funds of their increasing voting
power. We are hopeful that, as funds become more experienced and sophisti-
cated participants in the election process, they will increase their attempts to
hold directors accountable beyond the efforts that we find here.122 Although
votes of Vanguard or Fidelity. See Appendix, Tables A4 (Vanguard) and A6 (Fidelity Non-
Index Funds).
122 See, e.g., Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio, Ferri & David A. Maber, Reputation Penalties for
Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 109
(2012) (finding that, although investors withheld votes from directors at firms involved in
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some scholars have questioned the ability of institutional investors to im-
prove issuer performance through shareholder activism,123 it is nonetheless
true that intelligent voting by those shareholders with a meaningful eco-
nomic interest offers a promising mechanism for increasing board
accountability.
options backdating scandals, they did not “withhold” votes from those same directors at firms
not involved in the scandals).
123 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. REG. 174 (2001) (finding that
institutional activism through shareholder proposals does not improve, and in some cases dam-
ages, firm performance).
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APPENDIX
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable Definition
CEO Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is the CEO
of the company in question and 0 otherwise.
New Director Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director has been
on the board for less than 2 years and 0 otherwise.
AuditMbr Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is a
member of the audit committee and 0 otherwise.
Prior Restat Indicator variable equal to 1 if news relating to a
financial restatement was first made public within 2
years prior to the meeting date (either in a SEC filing
or through a public press release) and 0 otherwise.
Prior SEC Indicator variable equal to 1 if news relating to an
SEC investigation or enforcement action was first
made public within two years prior to the meeting
date (either in a SEC filing or through a public press
release) and 0 otherwise.
CompMbr Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is a
member of the compensation committee and 0
otherwise.
Top5AbComp Indicator variable equal to 1 if the total excess
compensation for the CEO for the company in
question is in the top 5% of the sample and 0
otherwise. We define total excess CEO compensation
as the difference between the total CEO compensation
for the year prior to the meeting date (as provided by
the Compustat Executive Compensation database)
minus the expected total CEO compensation. We
calculate the expected total CEO compensation by (1)
estimating an OLS model for Total CEO
compensation = a + b1market_capitalization +
b2One_Year_Abnormal_Holding_Period_Return +
b3Year_2006 + e. (2) Using the predicted Total CEO
compensation based on this model as the expected
Total CEO compensation.
Attendance Indicator Variable equal to 1 if director attended less
than 75% of the meetings and 0 otherwise (as tracked
by IRRC for the year prior to the annual meeting
date).
ManyBds Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is a
member of at least three other “major” company
boards (as followed by IRRC for the year prior to the
annual meeting date) and 0 otherwise.
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Age75 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is 75 years
or older and 0 otherwise.
NomMbr Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is a
member of the nominating committee and 0
otherwise.
Empl_Dir Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is an
employee of the company in question (but not the
CEO) and 0 otherwise.
OutDirLink Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is an
outside director of the company in question with
affiliated links with the company and 0 otherwise.
IRRC treats as linked a director: “who is a former
employee; is an employee of or is a service provider,
supplier, customer; is a recipient of charitable funds;
is considered an Interlocking or designated director; or
is a family member of a director or executive.” See
“Definitions for RiskMetrics’ Directors Dataset”
available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ds/
riskmetrics/dir_doc.shtml.
TotDirSH The percentage of the votes in the company in
question held by all board members.
Interlock Indicator Variable equal to 1 if director met the IRRC
criteria for an Interlocking director in the year prior to
the annual meeting date and 0 otherwise. IRRC
defines an Interlocking directorship as follows:
“whereby a director and executive of the company
sits on a board of another company that has an
executive and director who also sit[s] on the original
company’s board.” See “Definitions for RiskMetrics’
Directors Dataset” available at http://
wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ds/riskmetrics/dir_doc.shtml.
Chairman Only Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is the
chairman of the board of the company in question but
not an employee and 0 otherwise.
IP No Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company in
question faced a proxy issue proposal that received a
majority “for” vote in the year prior to the director
vote in question and failed to implement the
recommendations of the proxy issue proposal and 0
otherwise.
ClassBd Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director sits on a
classified board for the company in question (as
measured by IRRC for the year prior to the annual
meeting date) and 0 otherwise.
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Poison Pill Indicator variable equal to 1 if a poison pill exists for
the company in question (as measured by IRRC for
the year prior to the annual meeting date) and 0
otherwise.
CumVote Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company in
question uses cumulative voting to elect directors (as
measured by IRRC for the year prior to the annual
meeting date) and 0 otherwise.
Golden Parachute Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company in
question uses golden parachute agreements (as
measured by IRRC for the year prior to the annual
meeting date) and 0 otherwise.
Top5AbRet Indicator variable equal to 1 if the abnormal return for
the three-year period prior to the annual meeting date
for the company in question is in the top 5% of the
sample and 0 otherwise. The abnormal return is
defined as the three-year holding period return for the
company in question minus the three-year holding
period return for the CRSP value weighted market
index.
Bot5AbRet Indicator variable equal to 1 if the abnormal return for
the three-year period prior to the annual meeting date
for the company in question is in the bottom 5% of
the sample and 0 otherwise. The abnormal return is
defined as the three-year holding period return for the
company in question minus the three-year holding
period return for the CRSP value weighted market
index.
Sdret Standard deviation of returns for the company in
question for the one-year period prior to the annual
meeting date.
ln(Mktcap) Log of the market capitalization (in $ millions) of the
company in question.
InstHold Percentage of shares of the company in question held
by institutional investors.
Year06 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the director
recommendation is for 2006 and 0 otherwise (for
2005).
VoteISS Indicator variable equal to 1 if ISS recommends a
“withhold” vote for the director in question and 0
otherwise.
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APPENDIX TABLE A4: VANGUARD
Model (1) Model (2)
CEO -0.0484 0.0965
(-0.20) (0.41)
[-0.0023] [0.0042]
New Director 0.485** 0.410**
(3.85) (3.23)
[0.0196] [0.0162]
AuditMbr -0.185+ -0.189+
(-1.78) (-1.76)
[-0.0088] [-0.0086]
Prior Restat 0.116 0.116
(0.57) (0.54)
[0.0052] [0.0050]
Prior SEC -0.0153 -0.0144
(-0.05) (-0.05)
[-0.0007] [-0.0006]
Prior Restat x AuditMbr -0.103 -0.0926
(-0.41) (-0.36)
[-0.0050] [-0.0043]
Prior SEC x AuditMbr -0.410 -0.451
(-0.99) (-1.13)
[-0.0229] [-0.0246]
CompMbr -2.353** -2.330**
(-19.08) (-18.98)
[-0.1594] [-0.1512]
Top5AbComp -0.899* -0.876**
(-2.42) (-2.67)
[-0.0612] [-0.0567]
Top5AbComp x CompMbr -0.288 -0.265
(-0.60) (-0.58)
[-0.0153] [-0.0133]
Attendance -3.667** -3.247**
(-10.93) (-9.02)
[-0.6163] [-0.5084]
ManyBds 0.0981 0.234
(0.71) (1.54)
[0.0044] [0.0096]
ManyBds x CEO -0.508 -0.841
(-0.49) (-0.81)
[-0.0299] [-0.0554]
Age75 -0.0648 -0.0561
(-0.36) (-0.32)
[-0.0031] [-0.0026]
NomMbr -0.241** -0.210*
(-2.71) (-2.28)
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[-0.0115] [-0.0096]
Empl_Dir -1.331** -1.030**
(-5.16) (-4.34)
[-0.1075] [-0.0707]
OutDirLink -2.163** -1.825**
(-15.16) (-12.24)
[-0.2241] [-0.1624]
TotDirSH -1.487** -1.319*
(-2.68) (-2.49)
[-0.0695] [-0.0591]
Interlock 0.837 0.592
(1.62) (1.20)
[0.0273] [0.0205]
Chairman Only 0.749* 0.675*
(2.36) (2.14)
[0.0257] [0.0228]
IP No 1.161 1.982*
(1.31) (2.22)
[0.0335] [0.0409]
ClassBd -0.304* -0.293*
(-2.38) (-2.19)
[-0.0148] [-0.0137]
Poison Pill 0.249* 0.274*
(1.98) (2.09)
[0.0117] [0.0124]
CumVote 0.251 0.319
(1.32) (1.60)
[0.0107] [0.0128]
Golden Parachute 0.182 0.134
(1.30) (0.92)
[0.0089] [0.0062]
Top5AbRet 0.420+ 0.389
(1.75) (1.55)
[0.0166] [0.0149]
Bot5AbRet 0.301 0.313
(1.38) (1.28)
[0.0124] [0.0124]
Top5AbRet x CEO 0.191 0.317
(0.21) (0.38)
[0.0082] [0.0123]
Bot5AbRet x CEO -0.184 -0.127
(-0.24) (-0.15)
[-0.0093] [-0.0060]
Sdret -49.50** -44.41**
(-6.42) (-5.47)
[-2.3143] [-1.9892]
lnmktcap 0.140** 0.146**
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(2.87) (2.87)
[0.0066] [0.0065]
InstHold -1.167* -1.210*
(-2.14) (-2.12)
[-0.0546] [-0.0542]
Year06 0.560** 0.556**
(5.07) (4.83)
[0.0266] [0.0253]
VoteISS -1.624**
(-8.98)
[-0.1419]
Constant 4.446** 4.375**
(5.92) (5.60)
N 12163 12123
pseudo R2 0.243 0.270
t statistics in parentheses; +p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01. Dependent variable Vote = 1 if
the fund voted “for” and 0 if the fund voted “withhold” for the director in question.
Errors are clustered by company. Marginal effects on the probability of a “for” vote for
each coefficient are in brackets. For indicator variables, the marginal effect on the “for”
vote probability is for a change from 0 to 1.
APPENDIX TABLE A5: AMERICAN
Model Model
(1) (2)
CEO -0.240 -0.242
(-0.96) (-0.98)
[-0.0009] [-0.0008]
New Director -0.873** -0.881**
(-3.61) (-3.89)
[-0.0039] [-0.0039]
AuditMbr 1.198** 1.154**
(4.11) (5.00)
[0.0035] [0.0032]
Prior Restat -2.791* -2.913*
(-2.17) (-2.15)
[-0.0387] [-0.0421]
Prior Restat x AuditMbr -1.515** -1.450**
(-3.64) (-4.56)
[-0.0109] [-0.0097]
CompMbr 0.00409 -0.00198
(0.01) (-0.00)
[0.0000] [0.0000]
ManyBds -0.127 -0.115
(-0.30) (-0.23)
[-0.0004] [-0.0004]
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NomMbr 0.152 0.224
(0.31) (0.41)
[0.0005] [0.0007]
Empl_Dir -0.429 -0.471
(-1.07) (-1.15)
[-0.0017] [-0.0018]
OutDirLink 0.524 0.875
(0.40) (1.02)
[0.0014] [0.0020]
Sdret -43.84 -51.80
(-1.26) (-1.42)
[-0.1406] [-0.1607]
lnmktcap -0.546* -0.540+
(-1.96) (-1.90)
[-0.0018] [-0.0017]
InstHold -9.279 -9.079
(-1.49) (-1.49)
[-0.0298] [-0.0282]
Year06 1.190 1.084
(0.85) (0.81)
[0.0045] [0.0039]
VoteISS -1.476
(-1.32)
[-0.0099]
Constant 16.24** 16.33**
(2.81) (2.84)
N 1233 1224
pseudo R2 0.277 0.282
z statistics in parentheses; +p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01. Dependent variable Vote = 1
if the fund voted “for” and 0 if the fund voted “withhold” for the director in question.
Errors are clustered by company. Marginal effects on the probability of a “for” vote for
each coefficient are in brackets. For indicator variables, the marginal effect on the “for”
vote probability is for a change from 0 to 1.Note that Prior SEC, Top5AbComp,
Attendance, ManyBds x CEO, Age75, Interlock, Chairman Only, IP No, ClassBd, Poison
Pill, CumVote, Top5Abret, Bot5Abret = 1 all predicted Vote = 1 (“for” vote) perfectly
and were dropped from the models (along with the corresponding observations). Prior
SEC x AuditMbr, Top5AbComp x CompMbr, Top5Abret x CEO, and Bot5Abret x CEO
were dropped due to collinearity with other independent variables.
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APPENDIX TABLE A6: FIDELITY NON-INDEX FUNDS
Model Model
(1) (2)
CEO 0.0872 0.0981
(0.36) (0.40)
[0.002] [0.0019]
New Director -0.0578 -0.0785
(-0.30) (-0.41)
[-0.0012] [-0.0016]
AuditMbr 0.168 0.166
(1.08) (1.07)
[0.0033] [0.0033]
Prior Restat -0.701 -0.687
(-1.63) (-1.57)
[-0.0187] [-0.0182]
Prior SEC -0.652 -0.663
(-1.43) (-1.43)
[-0.0174] [-0.0178]
Prior Restat x AuditMbr -0.348* -0.338*
(-2.12) (-2.03)
[-0.0082] [-0.0080]
Prior SEC x AuditMbr -0.109 -0.128
(-0.70) (-0.80)
[-0.0023] [-0.0027]
CompMbr 0.146 0.159
(1.01) (1.10)
[0.0029] [0.0032]
Top5AbComp -0.294 -0.284
(-0.45) (-0.43)
[-0.0067] [-0.0065]
Top5AbComp x CompMbr -0.0740 -0.0655
(-0.50) (-0.42)
[-0.0016] [-0.0014]
Attendance -0.328 -0.193
(-0.44) (-0.25)
[-0.0078] [-0.0043]
ManyBds 0.00560 0.0227
(0.03) (0.11)
[0.0001] [0.0005]
Age75 -0.647 -0.640
(-1.53) (-1.50)
[-0.0178] [-0.0175]
NomMbr -0.0223 -0.00925
(-0.18) (-0.07)
[-0.0005] [-0.0002]
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\3-1\HLB103.txt unknown Seq: 46 20-JUN-13 13:40
80 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 3
Empl_Dir -0.664* -0.633*
(-2.42) (-2.27)
[-0.0180] [-0.0169]
OutDirLink 0.0610 0.135
(0.28) (0.57)
[0.0012] [0.0026]
TotDirSH -0.816 -0.814
(-0.87) (-0.87)
[-0.0165] [-0.0165]
Interlock -0.820 -0.886
(-0.79) (-0.85)
[-0.0251] [-0.0279]
Chairman Only 0.845 0.816
(1.63) (1.56)
[0.0119] [0.0116]
IP No -0.750 -0.549
(-0.71) (-0.54)
[-0.0220] [-0.0145]
ClassBd -0.272 -0.267
(-0.72) (-0.71)
[-0.0058] [-0.0056]
Poison Pill -0.437 -0.442
(-1.12) (-1.12)
[-0.0088] [-0.0089]
CumVote 0.394 0.403
(0.58) (0.59)
[0.0069] [0.0070]
Golden Parachute -1.331* -1.332*
(-2.46) (-2.47)
[-0.0208] [-0.0208]
Top5AbRet -0.422 -0.400
(-0.64) (-0.60)
[-0.0103] [-0.0096]
Bot5AbRet 1.606 1.634
(1.46) (1.48)
[0.0174] [0.0175]
Top5AbRet x CEO 0.200 0.220
(0.60) (0.66)
[0.0037] [0.0040]
Sdret -22.84 -22.06
(-0.96) (-0.91)
[-0.4625] [-0.4462]
lnmktcap 0.121 0.119
(0.73) (0.71)
[0.0025] [0.0024]
InstHold 3.268* 3.227*
(2.02) (1.97)
[0.0662] [0.0653]
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Year06 -0.791* -0.804*
(-2.25) (-2.28)
[-0.0163] [-0.0166]
VoteISS -0.429
(-1.08)
[-0.0104]
Constant 3.121 3.159
(1.40) (1.41)
N 9188 9158
pseudo R2 0.082 0.084
t statistics in parentheses; +p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01. Dependent variable Vote = 1 if
the fund voted “for” and 0 if the fund voted “withhold” for the director in question.
Errors are clustered by company. Marginal effects on the probability of a “for” vote for
each coefficient are in brackets. For indicator variables, the marginal effect on the “for”
vote probability is for a change from 0 to 1. Note that ManyBds x CEO and Bot5Abret x
CEO = 1 both predicted Vote = 1 (“for” vote) perfectly and were dropped from the
models (along with the corresponding observations).
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